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Abstract
This paper considers empirically whether preference-based (empirical) power in-
dices differ significantly from their preference-free (theoretical) counterparts. Draw-
ing on the to date most comprehensive sample of EU Council votes (1993-2011),
we use item-response models to estimate the EU27 member states’ preferences
(ideal points) in a one-dimensional policy space. Their posterior distributions are
then used for the calculation of empirical versions of the Banzhaf, the Shapley-
Shubik, and other power indices, invoking the concepts of connected coalitions and
bloc voting. Our ideal point estimates point to significant differences in member
states’ preferences, which often translate into significant differences of empirical
(versus theoretical) power under individual voting. However, the formation of
voting blocs appears to offset differences in countries’ ideal points as the bloc size
grows. Interestingly, this result does not hold up for the Shapley-Shubik index,
whose empirical variant differs from the theoretical one both under individual
and bloc voting.
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1 Introduction
While the theory of power indices in voting games is well researched, a key open question
that is still subject to debate in the literature is whether power indices should account
for actors’ preferences (Braham and Holler, 2005; Napel and Widgrén, 2005). This is
not only relevant from an academic perspective, but also of high policy relevance when it
comes to negotiating revisions of voting rules, since ’empirical’ (preference-based) power
indices may differ significantly from their theoretical (preference-free) counterparts.
Against this background the striking lack of comprehensive empirical evidence on
the relevance of preferences as determinants of actors’ voting power is surprising. This
paper does not aim at adding to the theoretical controversy about the benefits and
drawbacks of preference-based power indices. Rather we analyze empirically whether
the inclusion of policy preferences actually leads to a significant shift in actors’ voting
power.
Our study builds on the to date most comprehensive data set of EU Council votes,
providing us with a comprehensive and high quality dataset and a large number of
actors (with potentially large variations in policy preferences), while at the same time
involving a large number of (27) actors that is (computationally challenging but) still
manageable.
Standard measures of voting power such as the Shapley and Shubik (1954) or the
Banzhaf (1965) index, defined as an actor’s individual ability to influence the outcome
of a vote on an unspecified issue, do not consider actors’ preferences. Under a proba-
bilistic interpretation, this is reflected in the assumption about random voting behavior,
namely that actors’ votes are independent of each other (Banzhaf) or that all actors
are homogenous in the sense that all have the same probability of voting in favor of a
proposal (Shapley-Shubik).
These assumptions, however, are not necessarily consistent with actual (preference-
based) voting behavior. Preferences may matter for two reasons: First, actors are likely
to form coalitions and vote according to similar preferences. Based on the assumptions
of a spatial voting model, Garrett and Tsebelis (1999) presume that only connected
coalitions will form, i.e., only actors that are aligned next to each other in the policy
space will vote together. They argue that classical power indices will thus overstate the
power of extremist and understate power of centrist actors.
Second, actors with ’similar’ preferences will sometimes form a priori coalitions
(voting blocs) before the actual voting takes place (Malawski, 2004). Since the power
of the voting bloc is potentially larger than the sum of block members’ voting power,
forming voting blocs is a means for countries to increase their power (Widgrén, 1995).
Taken toghether, one could argue that only connected coalitions among voting blocs
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will form in the voting procedure.1
These features of voting behaviour, the formation of voting blocs and connected
coalitions, can also be observed in practical politics, e.g., in the EU Council of Ministers,
where EU member states often try to form alliances with like-minded counterparts
during the negotiations, such that preference-free voting behavior seems unlikely in
practice. As a result, the omission of preferences in the calculation of power indices
might lead to systematically biased estimates of actors’ power (such as EU member
states’ power in the EU Council).2
This paper considers empirically, whether preferences do in fact lead to a shift in
voting power. To this end we study empirically, using voting data from the EU Council
of Ministers, whether the theoretical (preference-free) power indices of EU member
states differ significantly from the empirical (preference-based) ones, which take the
formation of voting blocs and connected coalitions into account.
Thereby, we build upon Pajala andWidgrén (2004), who evaluate voting power using
empirical versions of the Banzhaf index incorporating actors’ preferences, which are
based on expert judgments of EU member states’ positions in a one dimensional policy
space (DEU dataset).3 Their results suggest that empirical power indices converge to
the theoretical power indices as the number of items increases. While these findings
are suggestive, the study by Pajala and Widgrén (2004) relies on a rather small data
set including information on 45 legislative proposals over the period 1995-2000, arising
from the lack of more comprehensive data on preferences of EU member states over
specific issues.
Notwithstanding the various benefits of the DEU data set, there are also some
caveats: Apart from the unavoidable degree of subjectivity involved in inferring prefer-
ences from expert interviews, this approach delivers only point estimates of countries’
preferences (positions), without giving information about their variability. However,
countries’ preferences and the implied preference-based power indices vary over issues
and also over time, since they are influenced by domestic and international political
developments. To overcome this difficulty, Hagemann (2007, 2008) and Hagemann and
Høyland (2008) suggest using Bayesian Ideal Point Estimation (Clinton et al., 2004;
Bafumi et al., 2005) based on the logistic item-response model (IRM), which allows
1 The following terminology will be used throughout the paper: Preference-free and theoretical power
indices are used interchangeably. Empirical power indices (or preference-based power indices) are
used to refer to power indices, where preferences are taken into account through the formation of
a priori coalitions (voting blocs) or through the assumption that only connected coalitions (among
single actors or voting blocs) will form.
2 Preference-based power indices have been criticized on theoretical grounds, the key argument being
that power is a generic ability determined by the rules of a game and not by individual preferences
over outcomes (Braham and Holler, 2005). Another point of discussion is the distinction between
decisiveness and luck, where the first refers to an actor’s impact on an outcome as a combination of
preferences and capabilities, and the latter reflects simply a coincident match of preferences and the
voting outcome (Braham and Holler, 2005; Selck and Steunenberg, 2004).
3 See Thomson et al. (2006)
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to obtain the posterior distribution of actors’ preferences (ideal points) based on the
observed voting behaviour.
The present paper adds to this strand of the literature by using preference (ideal
point) estimates for the calculation of empirical power indices, building on a new and
more comprehensive dataset of EU Council votes, using a wider range of power indices,
and explicitly accounting for the stochastic nature of preference estimates by random
sampling and simulation. In particular, it makes the following contributions.
First, we compile a new data set comprising Council voting decisions on 3353 pro-
posals over the period 1993-2011, which is the most comprehensive dataset used in the
literature so far. The time coverage enables us to make comparisons of preferences and
the implied empirical voting power over time and policy areas.
Second, this dataset is used to estimate EU member states’ preferences (and their
posterior distribution), which we use as an alternative to the positional data based on
expert interviews that are available only for small subsets of voting data. Apart from
increasing the data coverage, this approach allows us to account for the uncertainty in
estimates of member states’ preferences by using Bayesian estimation of logistic item-
response models, which yields a posterior distribution of EU member states’ preferences
rather than only single point estimates.
Third, these estimated ideal points (preferences) are then used to calculate alterna-
tive empirical variants of the Banzhaf index (and other measures of power such as the
Shapley-Shubik index), invoking the concepts of voting blocs (a priori coalitions) and
connected coalitions. Thereby, we explicitly take into account the uncertainty of the
preference estimates and calculate empirical power indices based on 1000 draws from
the empirical posterior distribution of the ideal point estimates. This yields a distribu-
tion of the empirical power indices, whose sample averages can be compared and tested
against their theoretical (preference-free) counterparts. The analysis is carried out for
both the whole sample, and for subsamples by policy area.
Our findings suggest that EU member states’ preferences differ significantly from
each other, both for the full sample and for many policy areas. In addition, preferences
appear to vary over time, which is reflected in strong changes in the composition of
voting blocs over years, i.e., no stable coalitions among EU member states appear to
exist over time. Regarding the implications for power, preferenes appear to have two,
potentially offsetting effects: First, by ruling out subsets of unconnected coaltions and
permutations, they lead to significant power changes under individual voting. However,
once we allow for the formation of voting blocs, the difference between the empirical
Banzhaf index (and the Johnston, Deegan-Packel, and Holler-Packel index) and its the-
oretical, preference-free counterpart fades away as the bloc size increases. Interestingly,
the Shapley-Shubik Index is the only index, where this result does not hold up and
where we find a significant difference between the empirical and theoretical index even
under bloc voting.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the empir-
ical power indices used. Section 3 outlines the application of item-response models
to estimate EU member states preferences from observed voting behaviour. Section 4
describes the voting data from the EU Council of Ministers over the period 1993-2011
and presents the estimates of EU member states’ ideal points, both for the full sample
and by policy area. Section 5 calculates the empirical power indices reflecting countries’
preferences, accounting for the uncertainty in the ideal point estimates, and tests for
equality with their theoretical (preference-free) counterparts. Section 6 summarizes the
main findings and concludes.
2 Theoretical and Empirical Power Indices
In this section, we formally define the concepts of theoretical (preference-free) and em-
pirical (preference-based) power indices that will be used in the quantitative analysis for
the EU Council of Ministers. We illustrate these concepts for the Banzhaf (1965) index,
following Pajala and Widgrén (2004). Going beyond previous studies, we will then also
define empirical counterparts of other commonly used theoretical power indices, namely
the Shapley-Shubik index (Shapley and Shubik, 1954), the Johnston index (Johnston,
1978), the Deegan-Packel index (Deegan and Packel, 1978), and the Holler-Packel index
(Holler and Packel, 1983).
2.1 The Banzhaf Index
2.1.1 The Theoretical Banzhaf Index
The (normalized) Banzhaf index of country i (BFIi) gives the share of country i’s
‘swings’, i.e., winning coalitions where the removal of actor i makes them losing, in the
swings of all EU member states and is defined as
BFIi =
∑
S⊆N [ν(S)− ν(S\{i})]∑
j∈N
∑
S⊆N [ν(S)− ν(S\{j})]
, (1)
where N is the set of EU member states (n is the number of member states), S is
a coalition (formed of s countries), and ν is a function such that ν(S) = 1 if S is a
winning coalition, and ν(S) = 0 otherwise.
By construction, it holds that ∑ni=1BFIi = 1. Notice that for our sample period
from 1993-2011, the number of EU member states (n) ranges from 12 to 27 (EU12: 1993-
1994, EU15: 1995-4/2004, EU25: 5/2004-2006, EU27: as of 2007). For each regime,
there is one theoretical Banzhaf index, depending on the rules of the game (voting
weights, thresholds) reflected in the indicator function ν. In our empirical analysis, the
focus will be on the weighted qualified majority voting under the EU27 as laid down in
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the treaty of Nice (and prolonged by the treaty of Lisbon), a regime that has been in
place since 2007 and will be replaced - after a transitional regime as of 11/2014 - by a
system of double majority voting as of 03/2017 (see Section 5).
2.1.2 Empirical Banzhaf Indices
Following Pajala and Widgrén (2004), we define three empirical variants of the Banzhaf
index which differ from the theoretical index in equation (1) by taking EU member
states’ preferences into account: the normal, middle, and boundary variation of the
Banzhaf index.
The Normal Variation
The normal variation (BFIn) differs from the standard Banzhaf index only by the use
of voting blocs instead of individual countries. Hence, the definition in equation (1)
applies, with the only modification that there are i¯ = 1, . . . , n¯ voting blocs rather than
i = 1, . . . , n EU member states, and that coalitions among the set of voting blocs (N¯)
rather than among the set of EU member states (N) are considered:
BFIni¯ =
∑
S¯⊆N¯ [ν(S¯)− ν(S¯\{¯i})]∑
j¯∈N¯
∑
S¯⊆N¯ [ν(S¯)− ν(S¯\{j¯})]
. (2)
Since we are ultimately interested in the power of EU member states, the blocs’ power
has to be distributed among its members. A natural choice is to allocate the blocs total
power to its members according to their weights in the bloc, i.e., BFIni = BFIni¯ ωi,
where ωi is the weight of country i in the bloc it belongs to, which we calculate as share
of country i’s votes in the total votes of the bloc.4
A simple example modified from Pajala and Widgrén (2004) serves to illustrate the
main points. Assume there are four voting blocs, which are aligned in the policy space
as A-B-C-D with weights A: 18, B: 8, C: 22, and D: 39. The threshold to pass a proposal
is 61. Columns (1) and (2) in Table 1 list all possible coalitions and winning coalitions.
Since only bloc D is pivotal in coalition ABCD (turns the losing coalition ABC into a
winning one), there are 10 (bloc) swings under the normal variation, and blocs A and
B score 1/10, C scores 3/10 whereas bloc D scores 5/10.
The Middle Variation
For the middle variation (BFIm), only connected coalitions are considered. With voting
blocs aligned in the policy space as A-B-C-D, a coalition consisting only of A and C
would not be a connected coalition, because the actor in the middle is missing (see
Table 1). An example for a coalition that is connected and winning would be ABCD.
4 For alternative definitions of the distribution of power among bloc members see Alonso-Meijide et al.
(2009).
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In this coalition, A and D are the ’boundary’ actors, while the actors in the middle are
the ’centrist’ actors. While ’boundary’ actors are only defined to be critical if they can
in fact swing the vote by leaving the coalition, the ’centrist’ actors are defined as being
always critical.5 The formal definition of the middle variation is given by
BFImi¯ =
∑
S¯c⊆N¯ [νc(S¯c)− νc(S¯c\{¯i})]∑
j¯∈N¯
∑
S¯c⊆N¯ [νc(S¯c)− νc(S¯c\{j¯})]
, (3)
where S¯c is a connected coalition, νc(S¯) = 1 if S¯ is a winning and connected coalition,
and νc(S¯) = 0 otherwise.
In Table 1, there are three winning and connected coalitions, ABCD, BCD, and CD.
Of the boundary actors, D is critical in all of them. B is boundary actor in BCD but
not critical. C is a boundary actor in CD and critical. The centrist actors (B and C in
coalition ABCD, C in collation BCD) are critical by assumption such that there are 7
swings in total, and bloc B scores 1/7, while blocs C and D score 3/7 each.
– Table 1 –
The Boundary Variation
For the boundary variation (BFIb), only connected winning coalitions are considered
as in the concept of the middle variation. However, centrist actors are defined as not
being able to swing a vote at all; the rationale behind this is that it is unthinkable that
a centrist leaves the coalition when the actors on both sides of him stay in the coalition.
Thus, only boundary actors can have a swing. The formal definition of BFIb for bloc
i¯ is given by
BFIbi¯ =
∑
S¯c⊆N¯ [νc(S¯c)− νc(S¯c\{¯i})]b(¯i)∑
j¯∈N¯
∑
S¯c⊆N¯ [νc(S¯c)− νc(S¯c\{j¯})]b(j¯)
, (4)
where b(¯i) = 1 if i¯ is a boundary bloc, and b(¯i) = 0 if i¯ is a centrist bloc. In our example
in Table 1, blocs D and C have 3 and 1 boundary swings respectively and score 3/4
and 1/4.
Notice the the boundary variation does not fit well the concept of the theoretical
Banhaf index (that ignores the ordering of the actors) and is more closely related to the
Shapley-Shubik index; as Pajala and Widgrén (2004) point out, the boundary variation
resembles an empirical variant of the Shapley-Shubik index. Hence, we will consider
the results for the boundary variation for completeness, but focus on an exact empirical
analog to the Shapley-Shubik (and compare it with the theoretical Shapley-Shubik
index) in the Section 5.5.
5 The rationale behind this is that the coalition would not be connected anymore if a centrist actor
leaves.
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2.2 Extensions
2.2.1 The Modified Middle Variation
We suggest another variant of the middle variation of the Banzhaf index, which is based
on the following consideration regarding the role of centrist actors. Assume that the
proposal in the policy space is ‘to the right’ of all blocks A-B-C-D. Then, if centrist
bloc B leaves the coalition, also bloc A will leave (since it is located farther away from
the proposal than B), such that only C and D remain. However, in that case actor B
is not critical by definition, but only if the coalition of the remaining blocs C and D is
losing.
A difficulty in the implementation is that knowledge of the position of the proposal
relative to the centrist blocs is required. If the proposals were located to the left of B,
then if B leaves, C and D would leave as well, and only bloc A would remain. Hence,
without further knowledge, both possibilities have to be considered.
We refer to this index as modified middle variation BFImˇi¯ , which defines a centrist
bloc i¯ only as critical, if its withdrawal from the coalition, along with the blocs located
to the right of i¯, and also to the left of i¯, turns the winning coalition into a losing
coalition. Formally, we have
BFImˇi¯ =
∑
S¯c⊆N¯ [νc(S¯c)−max[νc(S¯c\{¯i≤}), (νc(S¯c\{¯i≥})]]∑
j¯∈N¯
∑
S¯c⊆N¯ [νc(S¯c)−max[νc(S¯c\{j¯≤}), νc(S¯c\{j¯≥})]]
, (5)
where S¯\{¯i≥} (S¯\{¯i≤}) denotes the coalition S¯ excluding i¯ and the blocs to the right
(left) of i¯.
In our example in Table 1, in contrast to the middle variation, for the modified
middle variation, bloc B in coalition ABCD is not critical anymore, as the coalition of
C and D is winning. Thus, bloc B (as well as A) has no power at all, while C and D
each score 1/2. It should be noted that - without information on the location of the
proposal and status-quo - none of the two middle variations is preferable on theoretical
grounds; hence, it is worth exploring whether the outcome of the two approaches differs
from each other.
2.2.2 Individual Voting versus Bloc Voting
Wheras Pajala and Widgrén (2004) apply the aforementioned definitions of the em-
pirical power indices (the middle and the boundary variation) to N¯ voting blocs, we
will - as a straightforward extension - calculate the empirical power indices not only
for voting blocs but also under the assumption of individual voting of the EU member
states.
In Pajala and Widgrén (2004), the sole focus on voting blocs is natural, since the
EU member states’ preferences (positions) based on expert judgments from the DEU
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dataset (in discret numbers) are either different or exactly the same. This is not the case
for our estimates of EU member states’ ideal points based on actual voting behaviour,
which are defined as continuous variables.
To these empirical power indices under individual voting of EU member states, the
definitions in equations (4)-(6) apply, replacing the set of voting blocs N¯ by the set
of member states N and replacing the coalitions among voting blocs S¯ by coalitions
among member states S.
2.2.3 Other Power Indices
Other ‘Banzhaf-like’ Power Indices
Pajala and Widgrén (2004) consider the Banzhaf index and its empirical counterparts
only. While the Banzhaf index is one of the most widely used power indices, several
closely related (’Banzhaf-like’) power indices have been suggested in the literature:
the Johnston index (Johnston, 1978), which accounts for the number of critical actors
(swingers) in a winning coalition; the Deegan-Packel index (Deegan and Packel, 1978),
which considers only minimal winning coalitions (i.e., coalitions, where each actor is
critical) and accounts for the number of critical actors, and the Holler-Packel index
(Holler and Packel, 1983), which differs from the Deegan-Packel index by ignoring the
number of critical actors in the minimal coalition.
The concept of voting blocs and connected coalitions as reflected in the variations
of the BFI can be applied to define corresponding variations of these alternative power
indices. Here, we do not consider all possible variations, but rather focus on the - in
our view - most intuitive concept of the (modified) middle variation of these indices,
both under individual voting and under bloc voting. The detailed definitions of all
theoretical and empirical power indices considered in the present paper are given in
Appendix A.2 of the paper.
The Shapley-Shubik Index
Another widely used measure of power is the Shapley-Shubik index (Shapley and Shu-
bik, 1954). Unlike the aforementioned indices, it is not a straightforward extension of
the Banzhaf index, but is conceptually different in taking the ordering of the actors into
account; in an alternative interpretation, the Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik index
are based on different probabilistic assumptions regarding actors’ voting behaviour.6
The theoretical Shapley-Shubik (1954) index of country i gives the share of orderings
(permutations) of the set of n countries, in which country i is pivotal and is defined as
6 See Straffin (1977) for a discussion of the probabilistic assumptions about actors’ voting behaviour
underlying the BFI and SSI; Paterson (2005) provides corresponding results regarding the assump-
tions with respect to the voting polls.
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SSIi =
∑
S⊆N
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n! [ν(S)− ν(S\{j})]. (6)
Based on Edelmann (1997) and Perlinger (2000), we derive an empirical counterpart
to the Shapley-Shubik index (SSIci ), which restricts the set of allowable permutations,
accounting for the location of the actors in the policy space. It is given by
SSIci =
∑
Sc⊆N
2(|Sc|−2)
(
n−|Sc|
p−1
)
2n−1 [νc(Sc)− νc(Sc\{i})]b(i), (7)
where, aligning the countries in a one dimensional policy space according to their pref-
erences (ideal points), p is the lower bound of the coalition S = [p, . . . q], i.e., the rank
of the ‘leftmost’ country, and b(i) = 1 if i is a boundary actor, i.e., if actor i is either in
position p or in position q, and 0 otherwise. A detailed definition of allowable permu-
tations and the derviation of the empirical SSI are provided in Appendix A.3 of the
paper.
Again the definition in equation (7) can be applied under individual and bloc voting,
replacing the set of voting blocs N¯ by the set of member states N and replacing the
coalitions among voting blocs S¯ by coalitions among member states S.
Summing up, we will calculate and compare the theoretical Banzhaf index with
four empirical counterparts under individual voting and bloc voting. In addition, we
will also consider the Shapley-Shubik, the Johnston, Deegan-Packel, and Holler-Packel
index, and compare them with the empirical counterpart of the middle variation under
individual and bloc voting.
3 Item-Response Models and Preference Estima-
tion from Voting Data
The calculation of the empirical power indices defined in Section 2 requires information
on the preferences of EU member states. In the following, we outline our approach
to estimate EU member states’ ideal points in the policy space, following Hagemann
(2008), who in turn build on work by Clinton et al. (2004) and Bafumi et al. (2005).
The idea of the preference-based (spatial) voting approach is that actors are ordered
according to their preferences in a low-dimensional Euclidian policy space (e.g., but not
necessarily, on an ideological left-right scale). The locations of the actors’ preferences
are denoted as ‘ideal points’. It is assumed that actors vote in favor or against a
proposal, depending on whether their ideal point is closer to the proposal or the status
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quo (Steunenberg et al., 1999; Clinton et al., 2004; Napel and Widgrén, 2004).7
In the present paper, ideal points of EU member states will be estimated from voting
data in the EU Council of Ministers. Hence, there are i = 1, . . . , n EU member states
having voted on j = 1, . . . ,m items (proposals), which results in a binary n×m matrix
Y = (yij) of member states’ individual voting decisions, where yij indicates whether
country i has voted in favor of proposal j (yij = 1) or against proposal j (yij = 0).
Each country’s preference is defined as ideal point (or ideal point) θi, which is located
in a (one-dimensional) policy space. The status quo and the proposal are located in
the policy space with positions ψj and ζj, respectively. Countries are assumed to have
a quadratic utility function, which assigns a higher utility to positions that are closer
to the country’s ideal point in the policy space. Hence, voting in favor of a proposal is
associated with utility Ui(ζj) = −||θi − ζj||2 + ηij, whereas voting against the proposal
is associated with utility Ui(ψj) = −||θi−ψj||2 + νij, where ηij and νij are independent
error terms, reflecting uncertainty in judging the relative position of the proposal and
status quo, with E(ηij) = E(νij) = 0 and V ar(ηij − νij) = σ2j .
Under utility maximizing behavior, the probability that country i votes in favor of
proposal j is given by
P (yij = 1) = P (Ui(ζj) > Ui(ψj))
= P (νij − ηij < (θi − ψj)2 − (θi − ζj)2)
= P (νij − ηij < 2(ζj − ψj)θi + ψ2j − ζ2j )
= P ((νij − ηij)/σj < βjθi − αj), (8)
where αj = (ζ2j − ψ2j )/σj and βj = 2(ζj − ψj)/σj. Hence, the probability of a ‘yes’-
vote (piij) depends on country i’s ideal point, and the properties of item j relative to
the status quo, characterized by the ‘difficulty parameter’ αj = (ζ2j − ψ2j )/σj, and the
‘discrimination parameter’ βj = 2(ζj − ψj)/σj, indicating the distance (and direction)
between the location of the proposal and the status quo (the no vote) in the policy
space.8
Following Bafumi et al. (2005), we assume a standard logistic distribution, such that
P (yij = 1) = piij(θi, αj, βj) =
1
1 + exp(αj − βjθi) (9)
7 The framework for ideal point estimation is based on item-response models (IRM) that calculate the
probability of success of an individual in a test situation based on two factors, the subject’s ability
and the difficulty of the item (Rasch, 1980).
8 The discrimination parameter indicates how well an issue differentiates between legislators, with high
values corresponding to a strong correlation between the ideal point and the probability of voting as
expected. If βj is equal to zero, the probability of voting ‘yes’ is solely determined by the underlying
distribution of the error terms. The larger βj , the more an item discriminates among countries and
the stronger is the relation between the individual ideal point and the probability of voting ‘yes’.
In the standard case of a non-zero discrimination parameter, if the ideal point and the difficulty
parameter αj are very close, the actor is indifferent on a certain proposal (Bafumi et al., 2005).
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and the likelihood of the implied logit model with (unobserved) regressor θi, conditional
on the observed voting behavior Y, is given by
L(θ, β, α|Y ) =
n∏
i=1
m∏
j=1
(piij)yij × (1− piij)1−yij , (10)
where θ = (θi) is an n× 1 vector and β = (βj) and α = (αj) are m× 1 vectors.
In practice, voting behavior can deviate from pure utility maximization due to
outside pressures or strategic considerations. Following Bafumi et al. (2005), this ‘non-
sincere’ voting behavior can be accounted for by introducing error rates δ0 and δ1 into
equation (10), yielding the following generalized version of the logit model
piij(θi, αj, βj, δ0, δ1) = δ0 +
(1− δ0 − δ1)
1 + exp(αj − βjθi) . (11)
The logit model underlying equation (11) cannot be estimated using standard maxi-
mum likelihood methods, since we observe only data on voting outcomes. As suggested
in Clinton et al. (2004), we will use a simulation-based Bayesian Monte Carlo Markov
Chain (MCMC) approach to obtain estimates of the (posterior) distribution of coun-
tries’ ideal points, conditional on the observed voting data.
The basic idea of this procedure is as follows. If α and β were known, the ideal
points could be estimated. If the ideal points were known, α and β could be estimated.
The MCMC algorithm repeatedly performs imputations of the unknown parameters
and regressions, alternating between the ‘estimation’ of the ideal points, difficulty, and
discrimination parameters, thereby sampling utility differentials from their predictive
density (given the current values of the other parameters and the voting data).9 As
a result, we obtain the posterior distribution of the unknown parameters α, β and θ,
where our primary interest relates to the posterior distribution of the countries’ ideal
points θ. Before we turn to the estimation results for the EU Council of Ministers, a
brief description of the data is given (Clinton et al., 2004).
4 Preferences of EUMember States: Data and Ideal
Point Estimates
4.1 Data
We compiled a new dataset of EU Council votes over the period 1993-2011 by merging
existing data sources and collecting new data for the period 2007-2011. In particular, we
merged Council voting data from Mattila and Lane (2001) for 1993-1998, from Hayes-
Renshaw and Wallace (2006) for 1999-04/2004, and from Mattila (2008) for 05/2004-
9 See Martin et al. (2011) for a more detailed description of the algorithm.
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12/2006, and collected new data for the period 2007-2011 by web scraping of Council
documents, using the interface by Buhl and Rasmussen.10 This adds up to a total of
69195 individual voting decisions of EU member states on 3353 proposals, which is the
to date most comprehensive and largest existing database on Council voting. Since
unanimous votes contain no systematic information about differences in EU member
states’ preferences, only contested votes, i.e., votes where at least one member state
voted against the proposal or abstained, are considered such that we end up with a
total of 16035 voting decisions on 899 proposals.11
Of course, merging datasets raises several issues that deserve discussion. First, while
our new data for 2007-2011 incorporate only votes on legislative proposals, pre-2007
data also include non-legislative votes (such as Council decisions). Second, data for the
pre-1999 period were not publicly available and provided by the Council Secretariat
and are thus unlikely to fully cover all Council votes.
These shortcomings of the data have to be borne in mind. However, for the objective
of the present paper, namely making use of the voting data to estimate EU member
states’ ideal points (preferences), we regard these issues of minor relevance. First, there
is no strong reason to assume that countries’ preferences vary systematically between
legislative and non-legislative decisions, such that the potential overrepresentation of
legislative votes in the pre-2007 period should not introduce any distortions.
Second, the incomplete data for the pre-1999 period would only pose a problem, if
the missing observations were systematically related to countries’ preferences. However,
there is no evidence for such a systematic exclusion (Mattila and Lane, 2001; Hayes-
Renshaw and Wallace, 2006). In sum, given the benefits from the comprehensive period
coverage and the large number of observations, we regard the use of a merged dataset
as justified and suited with respect to the objective of the present paper.
One general characteristic of Council voting data that might affect the estimation
of preferences should be mentioned. Due to the so-called ‘culture of consensus’ in the
Council, proposals typically only reach the voting stage if most of the initial conflicts
between countries have been resolved (Heisenberg, 2005). Thus, the number of actual
votes against proposals is very low. While such informal agreements and strategic voting
behavior is captured to some extent by introducing error rates in equation (11), this is a
limitation inherent to all studies using Council votes (Mühlböck, 2011). Collecting data
and exploring the nature of the bargaining process that takes place before proposals
enter the stage of actual voting remains a challenging and potentially fruitful avenue
for future research.
A final issue in coding the voting data is the treatment of abstentions. While
10See the application programming interface (API) homepage by Buhl and Rassmussen: http://
api.epdb.eu.
11Excluding non-contested votes also ensures consistency of the dataset, since the Hayes-Renshaw and
Wallace (2006) data over the period 1999-04/2004 include contested votes only.
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abstentions in voting bodies are often treated either as missing observations or as a
third vote choice, within the Council’s consensus-seeking culture, an abstention is used
to signal that a country holds an opposing view; a diplomatic version of a ‘No’-vote
(Mühlböck, 2011). Thus, we count each abstention as support of the status quo and
disapproval of the common position, i.e., abstentions are coded with 0, as are votes
against a proposal.12 If there are no observed votes of a country (e.g. because they
were not eligible to vote, e.g., the UK on issues concerning the Schengen Area or the
Euro), these observations are treated as missing data.
– Table 2 –
Table 2 provides an overview of the dataset of contested votes over the period 1993-
2011, both for the full sample and for subsamples differentiated by time period and
policy areas, showing the number of proposals voted on, the total number of individual
voting decisions by member states, and the mean share of votes in favor of an item.
4.2 Ideal Points Estimates for EU27 Member States
In the following, we report the estimates of the item-response model given by equations
(10) and (11) for the full sample over the period 1993-2011, yielding (the distribution
of) the EU27 member states’ ideal points, and then turn to the estimates by policy
area.13
4.2.1 Results for the Full Sample
Results for all EU27 member states’ mean preferences over the full sample period 1993-
2011, along with the 95-% confidence intervals are illustrated in Figure 1. Obviously,
information on the (simultaneous) voting behavior of all EU27 member states is avail-
able only for the most recent period from 2007-2011. Nevertheless, the voting decisions
from the pre-accession periods (i.e., before 1995, 2004, and 2007) contain valuable infor-
mation on the relative positions of the (12, 15, and 25) incumbent EU members states
and are thus included in the estimation.
As can be seen from Figure 1, although there is considerable overlap of the confidence
intervals of EU member states’ ideal points, there are also several ‘gaps’ between the
12In this respect we depart from Hagemann (2008), who consider only abstentions in qualified majority
voting (but not abstentions under unanimity) as votes against a proposal. Apart from the view that
abstentions can be reasonably argued to reflect (passive) support of the status quo, our approach
has the further advantage to generate slightly more variation in the voting data. Since the share of
abstentions is small, this choice is not crucial for our results, however.
13The (outlier-robust) maximum likelihood estimation of the contaminated hierarchical logistic item-
response model that allows for non-sincere voting behavior (equation (11)) was performed using
the MCMCirtKdRob function in the MCMCpack library in R. A more detailed description of the
implementation is given in Appendix A.1.
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countries’ positions.14 Northern EU member states such as Sweden, Denmark, the
Netherlands and Finland are located on one side of the policy space, whereas southern
member states like Spain, France, Portugal, and Italy are located on the opposite side.
Moreover, Central and Eastern European member states that joined the EU as of 2004
are located fairly close to each other in the policy space, in between northern and
southern EU member states.
Given the multidimensional nature of ideal points and policy proposals and the
variation in EU member states’ relative positions over proposals and time, the estimates
for the one-dimensional policy space should be interpreted with care. The alignment
of member states in Figure 1 should not be understood to follow a meaningful policy
dimension, e.g. in terms of ideological left-right scale. Rather, ideal point estimates
should be taken and interpreted as what they are, namely countries’ average preferences
over numerous proposals in various policy areas and time periods, still allowing us to
judge the proximity of countries reflected in their average voting behavior.
– Figure 1 –
Overall, our mean ideal point estimates are in line with previous studies suggesting a
North-South pattern of coalitions in the Council, which has been complemented by an
East-West pattern after the EU enlargement in 2004 (Mattila and Lane, 2001; Naurin
and Lindahl, 2008; Mattila, 2008; Hagemann, 2008).
To judge whether the differences between EU member states’ preferences are also
significant in statistical terms, we perform pair-wise Wald tests on the equality of coun-
tries’ ideal points.15 In 130 cases (43.2% of all pair-wise tests) the pair-wise test of the
hypothesis of equal ideal points is rejected at the 1% level, in 39 (13%) cases at the
5% and in 32 (10.6%) of all cases at the 10% level. The joint test that all EU member
states share the same ideal point is rejected at the 1% level.
It should be noted that we move away from a full-fledged Bayesian approach and
invoke classical testing methods in order to assess whether EU member states’ ideal
points (and, subsequently, the implied theoretical and empirical power indices) differ
14The fact that all ideal points and confidence intervals are negative follows from equation (11), the
identification strategy, and the data set. actor i votes in favor of proposal j if βj and θi have the same
sign as this maximizes the value of the likelihood function. As neither the location of a proposal nor
the yes- or no-positions are known, we restrict the country with the most/least yes-votes to be on
the negative/positive side of the policy space (i.e. −1 and 1). Since we have data only on accepted
proposals, it does not come as a surprise to observe only negative values of θi and thus βj , as the
yes-position will be closer to the proposal than the no-position.
15Refer to the estimate of the n × 1 vector of countries’ ideal points as θˆ = (θˆi) and its (estimated)
variance-covariance matrix as Ωˆ = (σˆij), which are calculated as means, variances and covariances
of the 10000 posterior ‘observations’. The null H0 : Rθ = 0 with restriction matrix R can then
be tested using a Wald test given by m′(RΩˆR′)−1m ∼ χ2r, where m = Rθˆ is the discrepancy
vector and r is the number of restrictions (See, e.g., Greene, 2003, p.95, 487). For a pair-wise test
of identical preferences (H0 : θi = θj) the matrix R is a 1 × n vector with elements 1 in the i-th
column, −1 in the j-th column, and zeros elsewhere. For a test that all ideal points are the same,
the R matrix has n− 1 rows (restrictions).
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significant from each other.16 Alternatively, a full Bayesian approach could be pursued,
comparing the posterior likelihood of the voting outcomes for restricted models with
common ideal points for all (and subsets) of the countries. Such an approach, however,
would be computationally very expensive, in particular for the calculation of the em-
pirical power indices. Hence, taking a pragmatic perspective, we regard our approach,
which combines Bayesian ideal point estimation to obtain standard errors of countries’
ideal points with standard frequentist Wald-type testing procedures, as a reasonable
compromise.
4.2.2 Results by Policy Area
To account for the potential multidimensional nature of the policy space and differences
between policy areas, we estimate ideal points for different subsamples. The estimates
of the subsamples show considerable variation over years and policy areas. Results
for some policy areas of particular interest are displayed in Figure 2. The North-South
divide obtained in previous studies does appear in some, but not all policy areas. While,
e.g., the results for the policy area ‘General Affairs’ are pretty much in line with the
findings in Figure 1 covering the whole dataset, there are no North-South or East-West
coalition patterns to be found in the field of ‘Health and Consumer Affairs’.
A possible explanation for these differences is that the policy area ‘General affairs’
consists of topics the Foreign ministers are concerned with, i.e. mostly Foreign Affairs,
but also a range of issues not covered by other Council configurations. Due to this
diversity of issues within that policy area, it is not surprising that the distribution of
ideal point estimates is rather similar to the general distribution in Figure 1.
This is not the case for the policy area ‘Health and Consumer Affairs’. Here, the
extreme position of Germany might be due to the fact that Germany has already
detailed legislation concerning health policy or consumer protection and thus more
often supports the status quo (and rejects new EU legislation that potentially requires
costly changes of national law) than other EU member states.
– Figure 2 –
Similar reasons might account for the ideal point distribution of the policy area ‘Internal
Market’. Here no clear distinction between Northern and Southern or Eastern and
Western EU member states can be detected. Yet another pattern exists for the policy
area ‘Agriculture’, where we find France and Ireland, two EU member states that are
strongly supporting agricultural subsidies, on one side of the spectrum, and the UK
and Sweden, who traditionally oppose such a policy on the other side.
– Table 3 –
16See Sala-i Martin et al. (2004) for a recent important methodological contribution that combines
Bayesian and frequentist features.
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Finally, it should be mentioned that not in all policy areas the null hypothesis of
identical preferences can be rejected. Table 3 gives the joint tests on equality of the
ideal point estimates for the different policy areas, showing that in 5 of 14 policy areas
(Agriculture, Trade, Transparency, General Affairs, Internal Market) the hypothesis of
equality is rejected at least at the 5% level. In the remaining policy areas the joint test
is insignificant.
5 Estimating Empirical Power Indices
The estimates of EU member states’ ideal points are used to calculate empirical power
indices as defined in Section 2, invoking the concepts of voting blocs and connected coali-
tions. EU member states’ power is calculated according to the present rules governing
qualified majority voting laid down in the Nice Treaty (and the Treaty of Lisbon), where
the necessary quorum for the adoption of a proposal is defined in terms of a certain
share of the weighted votes and the population of the member states.17
As outlined in Section 2.2.2, the empirical power indices given by equations (3)-(6)
will be calculated ‘directly’ for single EU member states assuming ‘individual voting’;
in that case no voting blocs are assumed to be formed a priori, but the preferences
are accounted for by considering connected coalitions only. (The normal variation then
corresponds to the theoretical power index.)
Moreover, the empirical indices given by equations (3)-(6) are calculated assuming
‘bloc voting’, where a priori unions (voting blocs) of EU member states with ‘similar
preferences’ are formed before the voting takes place (and where the individual coun-
tries’ power is calculated from the share of the country’s votes in their voting bloc).
Before turning to the results for the empirical, individual- and bloc voting based
power indices, we outline how we identify voting blocs from the estimates of the EU
member states ideal points and how we account for the uncertainty involved in the ideal
point estimates.
5.1 Definition of Voting Blocs
In our analysis, we define two EU member states to be part of the same bloc if their dis-
tance in the policy space is below a threshold value, which is determined endogenously
17See ‘Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union’, Official Journal 2008/C 115/323 for the exact quota and voting weights of the
EU27 member states.
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by specifying a maximum number of countries that may belong to a bloc.18
Thus the threshold distance d¯ν and also the composition of the various voting blocs
is endogenously determined by the predefined maximum number of countries per voting
bloc. Limiting the maximum number of countries in a bloc is motivated by the fact
that transaction and coordination costs among member states are increasing with bloc
size, such that there is a decreasing marginal benefit of having another member added
to a bloc.
As a baseline scenario, we consider a relatively large maximum bloc size of up to
5 countries. However, in order to check the implications of alternative bloc sizes for
the estimation results, we will consider alternative values for the maximum number of
countries per bloc ranging from 2 to 5.
5.2 Accounting for the Uncertainty in Ideal Point Estimates
To calculate the empirical power indices for the EU27 member states based on the ideal
point estimates for voting data over the period 1993-2011, both for the full sample and
by policy area, we start by using the mean ideal point estimates, yielding exactly one
empirical power index for each country (for the total sample and for each policy area).
To take the uncertainty in the ideal point estimates (reflected in the posterior dis-
tribution of the estimates) into account, we do use 1000 repeated independent random
draws from the EU member states’ empirical posterior distribution of ideal points, and
- for each draw - (build voting blocs and) calculate empirical power indices for each EU
member state (derived from the power of the voting blocs). This yields an empirical
distribution of empirical power indices, from which we calculate the sample average19
along with its standard deviation. These estimates of empirical power indices will then
be compared with and tested against their theoretical (preference-free) counterparts.
5.3 Empirical Banzhaf Indices: Results for Full Sample
Table 4 shows the average empirical Banzhaf power indices defined in equations (2)-(5)
in Section 2 (the normal variation, middle variation, modified middle variation, and
18More formally, let dij = |θˆi − θˆj | be the distance between the (mean) ideal point estimates for
countries i and j (i, j ∈ [1, n]). c¯ is the maximum number of countries per voting bloc. Let d¯ν
be a threshold distance and Gd¯ν (t, p) be a set of n¯ voting blocs gy(y ∈ [1, n¯]) corresponding to the
threshold distance d¯ν . Then i ∈ gy ⇔ @j ∈ gx, x 6= y : dij ≤ d¯ν and |gy| ≤ c¯ ∀ y ∈ [1, n¯]. The bloc
assignment is implemented by starting with a high value for the threshold (all countries are part of
the same bloc), and decreasing the threshold until none of the voting blocs comprises more than the
exogenously fixed maximum number of countries per bloc.
19By the fundamental law of statistics, we expect the sample mean of the empirical power indices to
converge to the one implied by the mean ideal point estimates; in fact, with 1000 draws they turn
out virtually identical.
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boundary variation) for the EU27 member states and their standard errors.20
The first four columns report the ‘direct’ estimates of countries’ empirical power
indices, ignoring the formation of voting blocs, whereas the last four columns report the
countries’ empirical power indices under bloc voting. Notice that the normal variation
of the direct indices (first column) equals the theoretical Banzhaf index as defined in
equation (1) and thus serves as benchmark.
5.3.1 Results Under Individual Voting
As can be observed from Table 4, we observe that preferences do matter for EU member
states’ power if we do not take into account bloc building. Most EU member states’
empirical power indices, apart from the boundary variation, are statistically different
from the theoretical, preference-free Banzhaf index reported in the first column. Almost
all the t-tests reject the null hypothesis that the preference-based, empirical power
indices are equal to the theoretical preference-free counterpart in the first column.
Hence, it is interesting to explore whether there is some systematic deviation of
the point estimates of the empirical power indices from the theoretical ones. The
large number of indices and possible comparisons makes general statements difficult.
Nevertheless some regularities can be identified from Table 4.
Power under the middle variation differs sizeably from that under the normal vari-
ation for several countries. In particular, a number of small EU member states with a
centrist position (such as Malta, Slovenia, Slovakia, Hungary) gain, whereas countries
with an extremist position (UK, Spain) lose. Country size does not appear to play
a crucial role here, since there are also large EU member states (such as Germany)
that gain moderately compared with the theoretical, preference-free index in the first
column.
Comparing the middle variation defined in equation (3) with its modified variant in
equation (5), results in the second and third column turn out virtually identical. The
quantitative figures are very close and there is also hardly a difference in the number of
EU member states where the empirical index differs from the theoretical one. Appar-
ently, in only a negliglible number of voting constellations does it appear to be the case
that the ‘exit’ of a centrist actor leaves a winning ‘left’ or ‘right’ coalition, suggesting
that the middle variation, despite its potential theoretical shortcomings compared with
its modified counterpart, captures the concept of connected coalitions reasonably well.
Under the boundary variation, most small countries’ power is reduced to values
close to zero and is shifted to a few large EU member states such as France, Germany,
Italy, Spain, and the UK. However, it should be borne in mind that most indices
are not significantly different from the theoretical Banzhaf index in statistical terms.
20We also carried out the same analysis for the EU15 using ideal point estimates based on voting
decisions over the period 1995-2004 and obtained qualitatively very similar results. Hence, the
results for the EU15 are omitted for the sake of brevity.
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Moreover, from a theoretical perspective, the Banzhaf index does not appear to fit well
the concept of a boundary actor (see Section 2.1.2), which is more closely related to
the Shapley-Shubik index, whose empirical counterpart will be considered in Section
5.5 below.
5.3.2 Results Under Bloc Voting
As can be see from the right part of Table 4, the picture changes when the individual
countries’ power derived from the power of the voting blocs is considered. With a
maximum bloc size of 5 countries, the empirical power indices do not differ significantly
from the theoretical Banzhaf index except for Sweden and the United Kingdom, a result
which is most likely due to sampling variation; with a significance level of 5%, the result
that 2 out of 27 countries (7%) show a significant deviation is not unexpected.
We expect the result to depend on the size of the voting blocs. Hence, we calculate
individual countries’ voting power derived from voting blocs with different numbers of
maximum bloc size, ranging from 2 to 5. Consider the middle variation, which is the
empirical index showing the largest number of significant deviations from the theoretical
one. in the extreme case with at most 1 country per bloc (individual voting), the middle
variation of the Banzhaf index turned out significantly different for 20 countries (or 74%
of all 27 EU member states) at the 5% level. With a maximum group size of 2, the
number of countries with significant deviations drops to 7 (26% of all 27 EU member
states). Increasing the maximum bloc size further to 3 or more countries, the number
of countries with significant devations is reduced to 2 (7% of all 27 EU member states),
which is roughly equal to the Type I error with a significance level of 5%.
The question of which is the ‘right’ bloc size will vary over issues and cannot be
answered in gerneral terms. However, a general finding is that preferces appear to have
two potentially offsetting results on countries’ empirical power. On the one hand, they
introduce significant differences between countries’ empirical power indices and their
theoretical counterparts under individual voting. On the other hand, by leading to
the formation of voting blocs, they also reduce number and heterogeneity of actors by
merging their preferces - apparently by more than their standard deviation - such that
the differences between the empirical power indices and their theoretical counterparts
fade away in statistical terms under bloc voting as the maximum bloc size increases.
– Table 4 –
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5.4 Empirical Banzhaf Indices: Results by Policy Area
Table 5 reports summary results for the empirical power indices, both for the full sample
and also by policy area under bloc voting.21 In particular, it gives - for each variant
of the empirical power index - the root means squared error (RMSE) of the difference
between the theoretical and empirical power indices over all 27 EU member states and
the number of countries where the deviations of the empirical power index from the
theoretical one turned out significant.
– Table 5 –
The RMSE is larger for the policy areas than on average for the full sample as far as
the normal variation is concerned. Regarding the other variations of the index, the
deviation is fairly small with values around 3% and tends to be slightly larger for some
policy areas (compared with the full sample), in particular for those, where the ideal
point estimates indicate significant differences in the EU member states’ preferences
(Agriculture, General Affairs, Internal Market, Trade, Transparency; see Table 3).
Finally, also for the policy areas, the t-tests reject the equality of theoretical and
empircal power indices only in a very small number of cases, suggesting once more that
the deviation of the empirical power indices (and the role of preferences) is moderate
at best. This is a result we expect to hold if voting blocs change frequently and un-
systematically from proposal to proposal, such that the effect of allowing for connected
coalitions is averaged out over a large number of proposals under bloc voting.
To provide some informal evidence on this hypothesis, we estimate EU member
states’ ideal points for each year over the period 1993-2011, and consider the bloc
formation for each year to see whether there are stable voting blocs (of a least two
countries) over time. It turns out that no such stable coalitions can be identified,
pointing to large variations in the relative ideal points from year to year (proposal to
proposal) and hence a large variation in the size and composition of voting blocs. This
result is also in line with Pajala and Widgrén (2004), who argue that no stable minimal
coalitions exist over time.
5.5 Results for other ‘Banzhaf-like’ Indices and the Shapley-
Shubik Index
Finally, we also estimate empirical variants under individual and bloc voting of other
power indices (see Section 3.5.3). Table 6 displays the theoretical indices and their
21For computational reasons, we did not consider individual voting for all policy areas, but some
explorative calculations suggest no qualitative differences compared with the full sample: Under
individual voting, the empirical indices (in particular the middle and modified middle variation)
differ significantly from the theoretical ones for many EU member states, while they hardly do under
bloc voting with a maximum bloc size of 3 or more countries.
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empirical counterparts defined in Appendix A.2, both under individual voting and under
bloc voting with a maximum bloc size of 5 countries.
– Table 6 –
In line with the results for the Banzhaf index and its empirical variations, the picture
for the alternative ‘Banzhaf-like’ power indices is very similar as evident from the left
and right part of Table 6. Under individual voting, empirical power indices are different
for a large share of the EU27 member states under individual voting, but this difference
vanishes under bloc voting with a maximum bloc size of 5 countries. In contrast, the
empirical SSI remains significantly different from its theoretical counterpart even under
bloc voting.
5.6 Empirical Power and The Role of Bloc Size
Given the sensitivity of the results with respect to the maximum bloc size obtained for
the BFI in Section 5.3, we repeat the calculation for all other ‘Banzhaf-like’ indices
(JNI, DPI, HPI) and the empirical variant of the SSI for alternative bloc sizes.
Table 7 summarizes the results for alternative maximum bloc sizes, ranging from 2 to
5, and provides the share of countries (out of the 27 EU member states) for which the
empirical power indices differ from their theoretical counterparts.
– Table 7 –
Interestingly there is a apparent difference between the Banzhaf (and the ‘Banzhaf-like’
indices) compared with the SSI. For the BFI, JNI, DPI, and HPI, the differences
between empirical and theoretical power indices fades away with increasing bloc size.
Depending on the index, the threshold size, where the share of significant coefficients
is roughly equal to the Type I error, ranges from 3 to 4. In stark contrast, the power
implied by the empirical SSI, which differs from its theoretical counterpart for virtually
all EU member states under individual voting, turns out to be rather insensitve against
the formation of voting blocs. Even with a maximum bloc size of 5 countries, the share
of significantly different indices still amounts to 37%.
This adds another interesting dimension where the results between the SSI and
the BFI (and related indices) differ strongly from each other. While changes of single
EU member states’ power implied by treaty reform are often very similar in terms of
both indices, the proportionality of the voting system and its efficiency is typically
much larger for the SSI.22 Our results suggest a further difference, namely regarding
the sensitivity of the theoretical measures against the consideration of preferences in
general, and the implications of the formation of voting blocs in particular. The central
22Paterson (2005) discusses the large differences between efficiency implied by the Banzhaf and the
Shapley-Shubik approach in the EU Council of Ministers after the treaty of Nice.
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role of pivotal boundary actors inherent in the logic of the SSI appears to be decisive
for the results even under bloc voting.
6 Conclusions
This paper tests whether differences in actors’ preferences translate into significant
differences between theoretical power and empirical power indices, using voting data
from the EU Council of Ministers over the period 1993-2011. To do so we consider
empirical variants of the Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index, which take
countries’ preferences into account by restricting the set of allowable coalitions and
permutations (depending on the alignment of the countries in the policy space) and by
allowing for the formation of a prioiri unions and bloc voting.
EU member states’ preferences in a one-dimensional policy space are calculated
using logistic-item response models, which provide estimates of countries’ average pref-
erences over the sample period and their distribution. Using random draws of countries’
preferences from this posterior distribution yields a posterior distribution of implied em-
pirical power indices, both under individual voting and bloc voting, whose average is
then tested for equality with the respective theoretical, preference-free index.
Results from the ideal point estimation show that EU member states’ preferences do
in fact differ significantly from each other, both for the full sample and for many policy
areas. For a large share of EU member states, these differences in preferences trans-
late into significant differences of individual countries’ empirical power. However, the
formation of voting blocs appears to offset to some extent differences in the countries’
ideal points in the policy space. With growing size of the voting blocs, the difference
between the empirical Banzhaf indices, derived from voting blocs with a maximum bloc
size of more than 3 member states, and the theoretical, preference-free Banzhaf index
fades away. Interestingly, this result does not hold up for the Shapley-Shubik index,
whose empirical variant differs from the theoretical both under individual voting and
bloc voting.
Overall, our estimates suggest that preferences matter, though with two apparently
offsetting effects. One the one hand, they rule out certain coalitions (among countries
remote from each other in the policy space), thereby leading to a change in empirical
power under individual voting. The magnitude and direction of the change will depend
not only on country size but also on the countries’ position in the policy space, which
may change over time. On the other hand, the formation of voting blocs reduces the
number of and the heterogeneity among actors, and thereby the difference between
empirical and theoretical power indices. Since preferences, the formation of voting
blocs, as well as their size and composition, will vary over issues and time as can be
observed in the EU Council of Ministers, general statements would be be misleading.
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However, a general result is that preferences - besides the rules of the voting game -
can be an important determinant of actors’ power.
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Appendix
A.1 Estimation of EU Member States’ Ideal Points
Following Hagemann (2008), we estimate the parameters of the one-dimensional con-
taminated hierarchical logistic item response model (IRM) in equation (10) with max-
imum likelihood, using the MCMCirtKdRob function in the MCMCpack library in
R.23 The Bayesian estimation of the likelihood function uses a Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) simulation method that draws from a prior distribution, estimates the
parameters and updates the prior distribution. In particular, the MCMC algorithm
draws 110000 times from the (updated) prior distribution. The first 10000 draws are
discarded to find an arbitrary starting point in the country-item-space, then the maxi-
mum likelihood estimates of the mean and the variance of the parameters of each 10th
draw are recorded, yielding a posterior distribution made up of 10000 observations.
We assign non-informative priors to avoid influencing the posterior distribution with
subjective prior beliefs.24 Following Martin et al. (2011), country i’s ideal point θi is
assumed to follow a standard normal distribution, for the item parameters αj and βj
the (normal) prior distribution [αj, βj]′ ∼ N(K+1)(b0,j, B0,j) is assumed, where B0,j is
a diagonal matrix for the prior precision of the independent normal prior on the item
parameters. Like Hagemann (2008) we set the precision equal to 1/σ2 = 0.25 which
implies a priori variance equal to 4. The error rates δ0 and δ1 are estimated from the
data and are assumed to follow an independent uniform (0, 0.1) prior distribution.
Finally, for identification constraints on θi have to be imposed; in a one-dimensional
policy space two constraints are sufficient for identification (Clinton et al., 2004). In
particular, we deduce the restrictions from the data and restrict the country with the
largest share of yes-votes to be negative and the one with the largest share of no-votes to
be positive. However, the posterior distributions turn out to be insensitive to the choice
of identifying restrictions, given that our model is locally identified by two arbitrary
constraints (Rivers, 2003).
A.2 Definition of Theoretical and Empirical Power Indices
Table A1 gives an overview of the power indices considered in the paper. The first col-
umn reports the standard definitions of the theoretical (preference-free) indices. The
second column reports the empirical power indices, accounting for preferences by con-
sidering only connected coalitions (BFI, JNI, DPI, HPI) or permutations that con-
stitute a maximal chain (SSI). We adopt the following notation:
23We would like to thank Bjørn Høyland for sharing his R-code (see http://folk.uio.no/
bjornkho/).
24Clinton et al. (2004) find that the results for voting in the US senate and the US House of Repre-
sentatives in general appear to be insensitive to the choice of the prior.
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N is the set of EU member states (n = |N | is the number of member states), and S is
a coalition (formed of s = |S| countries). The function ν is defined such that ν(S) = 1
if S is a winning coalition, and ν(S) = 0 otherwise. Sc is a connected coalition, i.e., a
coalition comprising only actors that are aligned next to each in the policy space. The
function νc is defined such that νc(Sc) = 1 if Sc is a winning and connected coalition,
and νc(Sc) = 0 otherwise.
The term κ(S) denotes the number of critical actors in a winning coalition S (re-
quired for the calculation of JNI); M(ν) is the set of all minimal winning coalitions,
m(ν) = |M(ν)| is the number of minimal winning coalitions, and S 3 i indicates that
the coalition S contains actor i (required for the calculation of the DPI and HPI).
Finally, p is the lower bound and q is the upper bound of coalition S = [p, . . . , q], i.e.,
the ‘leftmost’ and ‘rightmost’ countries in a coalition (in terms of their ideal points in
the one-dimensional policy space), b(i) = 1 if i is a boundary actor, i.e., actor i is either
in position p or in position q, and 0 otherwise (required for the calculation of the SSI).
Under bloc voting the same definitions apply, with the only modification that there
are i¯ = 1, . . . , n¯ voting blocs rather than i = 1, . . . , n EU member states, and (con-
nected) coalitions S¯ of voting blocs among the set of voting blocs N¯ rather than coali-
tions S among the set of individual member states N are considered.
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Table A1: Definition of Power Indices
Theoretical Power Index Empirical Power Index
BFIi
∑
S⊆N [ν(S)− ν(S\{i})]∑
j⊆N
∑
S⊆N [ν(S)− ν(S\{j})]
∑
Sc⊆N [νc(Sc)− νc(Sc\{i})]∑
j⊆N
∑
Sc⊆N [νc(Sc)− νc(Sc\{j})]
SSIi
∑
S⊆N
(|S| − 1)!(n− |S|)!
n! [ν(S)− ν(S − {i})]
∑
Sc⊆N
2(|Sc|−2)
(n−|Sc|
p−1
)
2n−1 [νc(Sc)− νc(Sc\{i})]b(i)
JNI∗i
∑
S⊆N
S3i
1
κ(S) [ν(S)− ν(S\{i})]
∑
Sc⊆N
Sc3i
1
κ(Sc)
[νc(Sc)− νc(Sc\{i})]
DPI∗i
1
m(ν)
∑
S∈M(ν)
S3i
1
S
[ν(S)− ν(S\{i})] 1
m(νc)
∑
Sc∈M(νc)
Sc3i
1
Sc
[νc(Sc)− νc(Sc\{i})]
HPI∗i
1
m(ν)
∑
S∈M(ν)
S3i
[ν(S)− ν(S\{i})] = mi(ν)
m(ν)
1
m(νc)
∑
Sc∈M(νc)
Sc3i
[νc(Sc)− νc(Sc\{i})] = mi(νc)
m(νc)
* Notes: Definition of absolute indices; all indices are normalized such that they sum to 1. The variation
of the indices considered is determined by the definition of the function ν.
A.3 A Preference-Based Shapley-Shubik Index
A.3.1 The Edelmann/Perlinger Index
Perlinger (2000) derives a preference-based Shapley-Shubik Index, based on a framework
by Edelmann (1997), which restricts the number of allowable permutations to so called
‘maximal chains’ (M), defined as permutation of the n actors in the (’spectrum’) game,
where the actor in position i (of the permutation) is the ideological neighbour to an
actor in position 1, 2, . . . , i− 1 for all i ∈ N .25 It is given by
∑
M
1
m
[ν(M i)− ν(M i\{i})], (A.1)
where m = 2n−1 denotes the total number of allowable permutations (maximal chains)
25Two member states are called ideological or preference-based neighbors if there are no other member
states who, based on their preference estimates, are in a position between them.
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in a spectrum game with n actors, and M i denotes a coalition consisting of i and its
predecessors in the maximal chain M . Finally, ν(M i) = 1 if M i is a winning coalition
and ν(M i) = 0 otherwise.
The reasoning behind equation (A.1) is that - as an equivalent to the empircal
Banzhaf Index which allows only connected coalitions - a notion of allowable permuta-
tions of actors of the set N is required for an empirical Shapley-Shubik Index. Hence,
the Edelmann/Perlinger-Index allows only those permutations of N that consist of con-
nected coalitions at any point. For example, assume that N = {A,B,C} and that
actors are aligned as A-B-C in a one-dimensional policy space. Then, {B,C,A} would
be allowed, but {A,C,B} would not, as {A,C} is not a connected coalition. These
allowable permutations are exactly the maximal chains.
A.3.2 An Alternative Definition of the Empirical Shapley-Shubik Index
For computational reasons - the number of maximal chains increases very quickly with
the number of actors n - we derive an alternative formula (which is equivalent to
Edelmann/Perlinger-Index), which does not sum over maximal chains but over con-
nected coalitions (as we do for the empirical Banzhaf indices) and which also more
directly reveals the relation between the theoretical and the empirical SSI.
The derivation builds on the definition of the standard Shapley-Shubik index, which
gives the share of all permutations of actors of the set N , where actor i is pivotal:
SSIi =
∑
S⊆N
ab
c
d =
∑
S⊆N
(|S| − 1)!(n− |S|)!
n! [ν(S)− ν(S\{i})] (A.2)
Note that in equation (A.2) the term a ≡ n! gives the total number of orderings and
d ≡ [ν(S) − ν(S\{i})] = 1 if actor i is pivotal. Fixing the position of actor i, the
number of orderings of actors preceeding actor i is given by a ≡ (|S| − 1)! = (s − 1)!
and the number of orderings of the actors following actor i is b ≡ (|N | − s) = (n− s)!.
In the following we provide corresponding defintions of the terms a, b, c, and d re-
stricting the orderings to the number of allowable permutations, referred to as ac, bc,
and cc and sum over connected coalitions only. The number of maximal chains with
actor i exactly in position |Sc| = s is given by acbc. Thereby, ac equals the number of
options to build a chain of the elements of Sc (a so-called saturated chain from ∅ to Sc
in the notation of Edelmann (1997)), where actor i joins last. According to Lemma 1
in Edelmann (1997),
ac = 2(|Sc|−1)−1) = 2|Sc|−2 (A.3)
The term bc equals the number of options how to extend this saturated chain to a
maximal chain, i.e. to allowably order the remaining actors of the set N (or, in other
words, the number of saturated chains from Sc to N = [1, . . . , n]). According to Lemma
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2 in Edelmann (1997)
bc =
(
n− |Sc|
p− 1
)
, (A.4)
with p being the lower bound of Sc = [p, . . . , q].
As an equivalent to the number of permutations a ≡ n! in the original Shapley-
Shubik Index, the number of maximal chains in a spectrum game with n actors is given
by cc = 2n−1 according to Lemma 1 in Edelmann (1997).
Finally, only winning and connected coalitions, where actor i is pivotal (which is
only the case if actor i is a boundary actor, i.e. either in position p or q of Sc = [p, q])
have to be considered, which is accomplished by redefining term d as
dc = [νc(Sc)− νc(Sc\{i})]b(i), (A.5)
where b(i) = 1 if i is a boundary actor. Summing up, we arrive at the following
equivalent defintion of the empirical Shapley-Shubik index:
SSIci =
∑
Sc⊆N
2(|Sc|−2)
(
n−|Sc|
p−1
)
2n−1 [νc(Sc)− νc(Sc\{i})]b(i), (A.6)
where Sc is a connected coalition, νc(Sc) = 1 if S is a winning and connected coalition,
p is the lower bound of Sc = [p, q], and b(i) = 1 if i is a boundary actor, i.e. actor i is
either in position p or in position q and 0 otherwise.
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Table 1: Illustration of Preference-based (Empirical) Power Indices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Coalition S¯ Winning Connected Normal Middle Mod. Middle Boundary
A X
AB X
AC
AD
ABC X
ABD X A, B, D
ACD X C, D
ABCD X X D B, C, D C, D D
B X
BC X
BD
BCD X X C, D C, D C, D D
C X
CD X X C, D C, D C, D CD
D X
Total swings 10 7 6 4
Notes: There are four voting blocs (N¯ = 4), which are located in the policy space A-B-C-D
with voting weights A: 18, B: 8, C: 22, and D: 39; the quorum is 61.
Table 2: EU Council Voting Data: Overview and Some Descriptive Statistics
Proposals Individual Voting Decisions1) Share of ‘Yes’ Votes2)
Total 899 16035 88.33
By year
1993 9 108 86.11
1994 55 660 86.66
1995 77 1155 90.82
1996 47 705 89.50
1997 51 765 89.80
1998 55 825 88.60
1999 47 705 89.07
2000 54 810 83.58
2001 56 840 86.90
2002 75 1125 83.28
2003 88 1320 85.90
2004 47 865 87.28
2005 56 1400 86.92
2006 70 1750 88.00
2007 16 429 94.17
2008 19 510 91.96
2009 27 723 93.64
2010 30 804 92.41
2011 20 536 91.6
By Policy Area3)
Agriculture 239 3869 88.73
Cohesion 6 124 89.51
Ecofin 23 449 89.08
Energy 3 57 94.73
Environment 59 1122 89.21
Development 4 96 95.83
Fisheries 85 1432 90.57
General Affairs 53 1248 82.21
Health + Health & Consumer Affairs 41 736 88.85
Internal Market 124 2098 89.41
Institutions 10 256 91.01
Justice and Home Affairs 22 522 93.48
Research, Education & Culture 26 463 90.06
Social Policy 16 360 89.44
Statistical System 15 317 93.37
Telecommunication 19 367 92.91
Trade 15 225 75.11
Transparency 79 1179 79.81
Transport 58 1085 90.96
Notes: Data from 1993-2006 merged from Mattila and Lane (2001); Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (2006),
Mattila (2008); data as of 2007 collected from web scraping of Council documents using the interface by Buhl
and Rasmussen (http://api.epdb.eu). 1) Number of observations of individual voting decisions is equal
to the number of proposals times the number of EU member states that have participated in the voting. 2)
Mean of yit (×100 in %), corresponding to the share of ‘Yes’ votes in all voting decisions. 3) Categorization
into policy areas follows Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (2006). Research, education, and culture were merged
into one policy area due to the small number of observations. Two items could not be assigned to a paricular
policy area; hence the proposals by policy area sum up to 897 items for the full period 1993-2011. Information
on the policy areas Statistical System, Cohesion, Development, and Energy is only provided for completeness;
due to the low number of contested votes, they are not considered in the following.
Table 3: Joint Tests for Equal Ideal Points by Policy Area
Policy Area Test Statistic Policy Area Test Statistic Policy Area Test Statistic
Overall 300.28*** Health & Cons Affairs 34.60 Social Policy 0.01
Agriculture 135.19*** Internal Market 40.01** Trade 51.08***
Ecofin 0.01 Institutions 0.00 Telecommunication 0.01
Environment 0.18 Institutions 0.00 Transparency 154.47***
General Affairs 77.15*** Justice & Home Affairs 0.00 Transport 0.04
Notes: Test statistic from joint Wald test on equality of countries’ ideal points. ***, **, * indicate significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% level.
Table 4: Empirical Banzhaf Indices, EU27 (2007-2011)
Individual Voting1) Bloc Voting2)
BFIni
1 BFImi BFI
mˇ
i BFI
b
i BFI
n
i¯
BFIm
i¯
BFImˇ
i¯
BFIb
i¯
Austria 3.09 4.49*** 4.85** 0.72 2.97 4.74 5.21 1.04
(0.26) (0.71) (2.3) (0.21) (2.81) (3.12) (2.66)
Belgium 3.68 3.25 3.13 3.56 3.5 3.53 3.41 4.41
(1.62) (2.05) (5.33) (0.29) (2.5) (2.79) (4.96)
Bulgaria 3.09 4.43*** 4.71* 0.32* 2.92 4.1 4.44 1.21
(0.44) (0.9) (1.59) (0.24) (2.62) (2.89) (2.36)
Cyprus 1.25 4.42*** 4.74*** 0.23 1.2 2.97 3.22 0.44
(0.49) (0.95) (1.32) (0.1) (2.83) (3.14) (1.27)
Czech Republic 3.68 4.53*** 4.97*** 0.32** 3.53 4.98 5.52 0.48*
(0.16) (0.45) (1.55) (0.24) (2.57) (2.85) (1.68)
Denmark 2.18 1.14** 0.37*** 4.15 2.13 1.99 0.50** 2.44
(0.5) (0.32) (4.29) (0.2) (1.52) (0.77) (4.24)
Estonia 1.25 4.32*** 4.38*** 0.83 1.17 2.46 2.55 0.88
(0.51) (1.2) (2.51) (0.11) (2.75) (2.91) (1.59)
Finland 2.18 3.98*** 3.51 3.47 2.02 2.89 2.65 3.73
(0.56) (1.35) (4.25) (0.18) (2.55) (2.47) (3.27)
France 7.78 2.73*** 2.48*** 13.44 8.3 4.3 4.02 12.99
(1.6) (1.93) (7.78) (0.71) (2.67) (3.09) (8.91)
Germany 7.79 4.43*** 4.70*** 7.77 8.09 6.17 6.65 10.42
(0.31) (0.76) (6.42) (0.76) (2.14) (2.51) (7.17)
Greece 3.68 3.36 3.14 4.16 3.52 3.71 3.56 4.39
(1.5) (1.95) (4.85) (0.27) (2.61) (2.93) (4.97)
Hungary 3.68 4.46 4.86 0.76 3.54 4.88 5.38 0.87
(0.49) (0.8) (2.5) (0.26) (2.58) (2.93) (2.61)
Ireland 2.18 3.98* 4.01 1.81 2.07 3.29 3.36 2.03
(1.06) (1.66) (3.33) (0.18) (2.79) (3.06) (3.01)
Italy 7.78 3.43*** 3.35** 11.33 8.23 5.07 5.22 11.5
(1.45) (1.83) (9.35) (0.75) (2.74) (3.25) (9.39)
Latvia 1.25 4.51*** 4.87*** 0.00 1.19 2.85 3.13 0.26
(0.21) (0.67) (0.00) (0.11) (2.89) (3.19) (0.72)
Lithuania 2.18 4.51*** 4.90*** 0.48 2.07 3.7 4.05 0.55
(0.16) (0.49) (1.92) (0.16) (2.79) (3.08) (1.43)
Luxembourg 1.25 3.82*** 3.48 1.62 1.19 2.59 2.46 1.36
(0.97) (1.69) (3.17) (0.11) (2.89) (3.07) (2.4)
Malta 0.94 4.53*** 4.98*** 0.08 0.9 2.71 3.00 0.1
(0.23) (0.44) (0.83) (0.09) (3.03) (3.37) (0.59)
Netherlands 3.97 3.18 2.13 5.29 3.75 3.42 2.31 5.32
(0.72) (1.14) (4.91) (0.34) (2.03) (1.7) (4.13)
Poland 7.43 4.43*** 4.73*** 4.06 7.59 6.24 6.83 4.7
(0.42) (0.86) (5.95) (0.7) (2.27) (2.57) (6.17)
Portugal 3.68 3.1 2.67 4.69 3.52 3.14 2.83 4.58
(1.46) (1.91) (5.28) (0.27) (2.53) (2.78) (5.00)
Romania 4.26 4.42 4.77 0.68* 4.1 4.97 5.4 1.26
(0.57) (0.9) (2.16) (0.31) (2.53) (2.8) (2.86)
Slovakia 2.18 4.50*** 4.95*** 0.08*** 2.09 4.00 4.45 0.21*
(0.38) (0.58) (0.77) (0.15) (2.79) (3.12) (1.07)
Slovenia 1.25 4.51*** 4.95*** 0.07* 1.2 3.19 3.55 0.11*
(0.32) (0.54) (0.71) (0.1) (2.96) (3.33) (0.61)
Spain 7.43 2.41*** 2.29** 11.14 7.8 3.2 3.02 10.38
(1.81) (2.05) (6.39) (0.66) (2.76) (3.01) (8.01)
Sweden 3.09 0.29*** 0.19*** 5.18 3.06 0.29*** 0.29*** 2.99
(0.43) (0.21) (4.87) (0.29) (0.61) (0.55) (5.15)
United Kingdom 7.79 2.86*** 1.90*** 13.75 8.36 4.63** 3.00*** 11.35
(0.61) (0.8) (5.7) (0.67) (1.41) (1.69) (7.22)
Notes: Means and standard errors of EU27 member states’ empirical power indices, based on 1000 draws
from posterior distribution of member states’ ideal points (period 1993-2011). Normal variation (BFIn
i¯
),
middle variation (BFIm
i¯
), modified middle variation (BFImˇ
i¯
), boundary variation ((BFIb
i¯
)). All indices are
normalized (displayed in %). ***, **, * indicate whether the null that the empirical index is equal to the
theoretical one is rejected at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level by a t-test.
1) Power indices of EU27 member states calculated ‘directly’ under individual voting. The normal variation
under invididual voting is equal to the theoretical Banzhaf index.
2) Power indices of EU27 member states under bloc voting, given by the power of the voting bloc times the
share of the respective countries’s votes in the bloc.
Table 5: Empirical Banzhaf Indices by Policy Area (EU27, voting blocs)
βnı¯ β
m
ı¯ βˇ
m
ı¯ β
b
ı¯
RMSE # RMSE # RMSE # RMSE #
Full Sample 2.12 0 2.38 2 2.43 3 2.96 0
Agriculture 3.64 0 3.41 2 3.08 2 3.32 0
Ecofin 3.19 0 3.69 0 3.25 0 2.37 0
Environment 3.65 0 3.42 0 3.27 0 2.84 0
General Affairs 3.37 0 2.76 0 2.89 1 3.02 0
Health 2.85 0 4.07 1 3.03 2 2.88 0
Institutions 3.17 0 2.61 0 3.09 0 2.67 0
Internal Market 3.87 0 2.28 2 3.01 2 2.51 0
Justice and Home 3.87 0 2.38 0 3.92 0 3.51 1
Social 3.31 0 2.80 0 3.51 0 2.73 1
Telecommunications 3.38 0 2.66 0 4.34 0 2.21 0
Trade 3.08 0 2.83 0 3.04 0 2.34 0
Transparency 4.68 0 2.64 0 3.29 1 2.18 0
Transport 3.96 0 4.04 0 2.87 0 2.69 0
Notes: RMSE is the root mean squared error of the difference between the theoretical and the respective empirical
Banzhaf index over the EU27 member states; # denotes the number of countries’ of which the empirical index is
significantly different from the theoretical one (in terms of a t-test at the 5% level).
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Table 7: Bloc Voting and the Role of Maximum Bloc Size
Maximum Bloc Size
1 2 3 4 5
BFI 74.1 25.9 7.4 7.4 7.4
JNI 74.1 11.1 7.4 3.7 3.7
DPI 11.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
HPI 40.7 11.1 3.7 3.7 0.0
SSI 55.6 44.4 44.4 40.7 37.0
Notes: Share of the EU27 member states (in %), for wich the (middle variation) of the respective empirical index
is significantly different from the theoretical one at the 5% level.
Figure 1: Estimates of EU Member States’ Ideal Points, 1993-2011
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Notes: Dots indicate location of mean ideal point estimates, lines show 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 2: Estimates of EU Member States’ Ideal Points by Policy Area, 1993-2011
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